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On the Role of Cultural Distance in the Decision to Cross-list 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the role of culture in the choice of the destination market for cross-listing. 
We argue that firms cross-list in markets that have greater cultural similarities as investors are 
unwilling to invest in firms from culturally dissimilar markets and managers may seek to avoid 
potential conflicts with culturally disparate investors and managers. Employing Hofstede’s 
(2001) Cultural Dimensions, we find strong support for the hypothesis that firms from developed 
markets show a greater propensity to cross-list in a country with similar values to their home 
market. These results are robust to a range of alternative cultural measures including modified 
Hofstede’s scores, societal practices scores from the GLOBE project and World Values Survey 
scores.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The incidence of cross-listings, i.e. firms listing their shares on exchanges outside their home 
market, has provoked questions about the motives for this decision. One question that is still not 
well understood is what drives the choice of market to cross-list in (Pagano et al., 2002; 
Sarkissian and Schill, 2004). Numerous theories have been proposed to explain the choice of 
“host” market, however, none offer complete explanations for the observed cross-listing 
behaviour.1  
 
One potential explanation that has been largely overlooked in this literature is culture.2 There is a 
growing awareness of the importance of culture in financial decision making. Specifically, 
studies have shown that cultural distance, a measure of the differences between cultures, 
provides additional explanations for the size of the flow of both debt (Aggarwal et al., 2012) and 
equity (Siegel et al., 2010) capital between countries, the extent of the home bias (Beugelsdijk 
and Frijns, 2010; Anderson et al., 2011), and the degree of cross-border M&A activity (Ahern et 
al., 2012). These papers conclude that capital flows between countries that are more culturally 
similar are greater than those between countries that are less similar. Cross-listing, in effect, 
represents a form of cross-border capital flow, albeit, one where the company itself makes its 
shares available to foreign investors.  
 
                                                          
1see Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Errunza and Miller (2000), Merton (1987), Foerster and Karolyi (1998), Doidge et 
al. (2004), Fuerst (1998), and Sarkissian and Schill (2004). 
2Sarkissian and Schill (2004) are the only to consider culture to date. They include cultural proximity, measured by 
common language and colonial ties, and show an important role of this proxy in explaining the cross-listing 
decision.  
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In this paper, we argue that cultural distance is an important determinant in the choice of host 
market. One possible explanation is that investors in the host country may not be willing to 
invest in companies from culturally dissimilar markets (see e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). 
This unwillingness may be anticipated by the cross-listing firm and may reduce the propensity to 
list in culturally dissimilar markets. Alternatively, having investors with different social norms, 
beliefs and cultural values may create conflicts between the shareholders in the host market and 
management. As a result, firms may choose to list in culturally similar markets to avoid potential 
conflict (see e.g. Ahern et al., 2012). Both arguments suggest that culture should play a role in 
the cross-listing decision.  
 
We empirically examine the role of cultural distance in cross-listing decisions by employing a 
cross-listings dataset from 45 home markets to 32 host markets obtained from Sarkissian and 
Schill (2009b). To measure cultural distance we use Hofstede’s (2001) cultural framework, and 
assess the robustness of our findings by employing alternative cultural frameworks from Tang 
and Koveos (2008), the GLOBE project and the World Values Surveys. For developed home 
markets, we find a strong preference for cross-listing in culturally similar markets, even after 
controlling for variables that capture the traditional motives for cross-listing. This finding is 
robust to different measures of culture and cross-listing activity. For emerging markets, we find 
that cultural distance plays no role. This finding is consistent with Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) 
who find that cultural distance does not explain the foreign asset allocation of emerging markets.    
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background on the role 
of culture in the cross-listing decision. Section 3 describes our data on cross-listing activity, 
cultural distance and other factors that may affect cross-listing. Section 4 presents the findings 
from our analysis and robustness tests. We conclude in section 5. 
 
2. BACKGROUND ON CULTURE AND CROSS-LISTING 
 
Several theories and arguments have been proposed to explain the motivation to cross-list and 
the choice of host market. Traditional arguments for cross-listing are predominantly based on 
barriers (e.g. market segmentation [Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977)] or informational 
barriers [Merton, 1987]), preference for better “quality” markets (e.g. improved liquidity 
[Amihud and Mendelson (1986)]; stronger investor protection [Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999)]; 
or stricter disclosure regimes [Fuerst (1998)]); etc. These arguments all suggest that firms look to 
cross-list in markets that are different to the home market. 
 
More recent studies suggest that firms choose to cross-list in markets where it benefits the 
corporation’s global strategy (e.g. Bancel and Mittoo, 2001), where peers are cross-listed 
(Pagano et al., 2002), and where it improves the firms image with their global customers (King 
and Mittoo, 2007). These arguments suggest that firms are more likely to cross-list in proximate 
markets, either geographically, economically or culturally. This idea was first amalgamated by 
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Sarkissian and Schill (2004) who argue that firms choose to cross-list in familiar markets, 
leading to a so-called proximity preference bias. 
 
Recently, several studies have started to examine the role of culture on financial decision 
making, with one strand of research focusing on how cultural differences between countries 
affect the cross-border flow of capital. Cultural distance, defined as the “sum of factors creating, 
on the one hand, a need for knowledge, and on the other hand, barriers to knowledge flow and 
hence also for other flows between the home and target countries” (Barkema et al., 1997, page 
427), measures the frictions created by differences in social norms and behaviours. Lower 
cultural differences facilitate the flow of information, as investors are better able to interpret non-
verbal and nuanced communications more accurately. Given the essential role of information in 
financial decision-making, if investors feel more comfortable about the level of knowledge and 
accuracy of their information, they are more likely to be willing to invest in foreign firms 
(Huberman, 2001).  
 
The notion that cultural differences negatively affect capital flows between markets has been 
empirically confirmed. Aggarwal et al. (2012) show that debt financing is greater between more 
culturally similar countries. Siegel et al. (2010) find a similar effect for equity capital. Conn et al. 
(2005) find that greater cultural distance reduces the abnormal returns for UK companies 
announcing foreign acquisitions, suggesting that the market views these acquisitions as having a 
lower probability of success. Similarly, Ahern et al. (2012) show that cultural differences affect 
both merger volume and synergy gains. Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) and Anderson et al. (2011) 
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find that investors display greater home bias (invest proportionally less in a foreign market than 
they should) when the foreign market is culturally dissimilar. Given that cross-listing is an 
alternative way of seeking cross-border investment, we postulate that culture will also affect 
cross-listing decisions.  
 
One way in which cultural distance may influence the choice of host market is the attractiveness 
of the firm’s stock to host market investors. This follows from Barkema et al. (1997) who argue 
that cultural differences create barriers to the flow of information. These barriers are likely to 
increase the difficulty in interpreting relevant information accurately and as a result reduce 
investors’ willingness to invest (Huberman, 2001). This argument is supported empirically by 
Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) who find that investors’ willingness to invest in a foreign market 
is negatively affected by cultural distance. The argument also finds strong support in the work of 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), who show that Finnish investors prefer to hold stocks in Finish 
firms that are located close to the investors, communicate in the investor’s native language (note 
that Finland has two official languages: Finnish and Swedish) and are run by CEOs that have the 
same cultural background. Managers contemplating a cross-listing are likely to be aware of 
foreign investors’ biases.3 Managers are also equally aware of the costs of cross-listing. If cross-
listings fail to generate a marked increase in shareholder base then the positive benefits 
(improved liquidity, reduced cost of capital, and ultimately a valuation premium) are unlikely to 
materialize. If investors are unwilling to invest in a company, the benefits of the cross-listing, 
                                                          
3Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) argue that this proximity bias in selecting a host market is driven by managers’ 
beliefs that investors are less willing to invest in companies that are unfamiliar to them.  
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such as increased liquidity, will fail to compensate for the increased costs from the additional 
listing.  
 
Another possible way in which culture may affect cross-listing is that managers themselves may 
be unwilling to cross-list in culturally distant markets. The purpose of cross-listing, as pointed 
out by Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) and Merton (1987), is to broaden the firm’s investor 
base. A broader shareholder base may expose the company to shareholders who have different 
cultural values and beliefs. These different beliefs may influence the way in which they view 
managerial practices and decisions. Siegel et al. (2008) note that greater differences in 
egalitarianism (one type of cultural distance) increase transaction costs for cross-border 
investments because of the impact of egalitarianism on managerial behaviour and policy-making. 
Attempting to bridge differences in views will cost a firm time, energy and effort and may lead 
to conflicts between management and shareholders (Ahern et al., 2012). As a result, firms may 
be more comfortable only cross-listing in those countries where business practices and cultural 
norms are relatively similar to their home market, purely as a way of reducing the risk of 
potential conflicts. 
 
3. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
3.1 CULTURAL DISTANCE 
To examine the effect of cultural distance on cross-listing activity, we rely on the cultural 
framework of Hofstede (2001). Hofstede’s (2001) culture scores are based on the responses of 
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IBM managers in various countries to a survey of their beliefs and social norms.4 Each of the 
countries is given a score on four cultural dimensions, Uncertainty Avoidance; Individualism; 
Power Distance; and Masculinity.5  
 
To compute cultural distance, we follow standard practice and use the Euclidean distance variant 
of Kogut and Singh (1988). This cultural distance measure has been employed extensively in the 
literature (e.g. Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Drogendijk and Slangen, 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2012). 
Specifically, we define cultural distance (CDij) between home market i and host market j as:  
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where Ikj is country j’s score on the kth cultural dimension, Iki is the score of country i on this 
dimension, and Vk is the variance of the score of the dimension. We calculate CDij for every 
possible combination of home and host market in our sample.  
 
                                                          
4Hofstede’s (2001) culture scores have been used widely in numerous empirical studies and research field. Kirkman 
et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature that employs Hofstede’s cultural values framework, 
citing more than 150 empirical studies. 
5
Uncertainty Avoidance refers to the extent to which people are uncomfortable with uncertain or unstructured 
situations and within the finance literature has been linked to risk aversion. Individualism reflects the degree to 
which a society emphasizes the individual as opposed to the group. Power Distance refers to the degree to which a 
society views an unequal distribution of power as appropriate and Masculinity refers to the emphasis placed on 
‘masculine’ values such as competition, ambition and acquisition versus ‘feminine’ values such as nurturing, caring 
and humility.  
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3.2 CROSS LISTING ACTIVITY 
We measure cross-listing activity between two countries by the number of companies cross-
listing from their home market in each host market. We obtain these data from Sarkissian and 
Schill (2009b). In total, we have data on 3,635 cross-listings from 45 home markets in 32 host 
markets as at the end of 2006 (excluding OTC, investment funds and off-exchange listings).6 As 
we measure the activity between each home-host pair, we end up with a final sample of 1,408 
home-host combinations (45 x 32 – 32).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In Table 1, we report summary statistics on cross-listing activity as a home market (i.e. how 
many firms cross-list from a particular country) and as a host market (i.e. how many firms cross-
list to a particular country). We also split our sample into developed (Panel A) and emerging 
(Panel B) markets as developing and emerging markets are affected by culture differently.7  Our 
sample contains 24 developed home markets. In total, these markets have 25,984 domestic 
listings and from these markets 3,015 firms cross-list (82.8% of the cross-listed firms in our 
sample) (reported in first columns of Panel A). This, on average, leads to a cross-listing activity 
of about 12% from developed markets. Examining the developed markets more closely, we 
                                                          
6From the sample of Sarkissian and Schill (2009b) that includes 3,683 cross-listings from 73 home countries in 33 
host markets we exclude home countries that contribute less than five cross-listings. We also exclude United Arab 
Emirates as a host country due to unavailability of investor protection data for this country. 
7As shown by Sarkissian and Schill (2004), the role of cultural proximity is different between developed and 
emerging markets, a finding that is corroborated by Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) in their study on the impact of 
cultural distance on international asset allocation. 
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observe that Canada has the greatest number of cross-listed firms (651) with 567 of those listed 
in a single market (the US). We also observe considerable numbers of cross-listings in the US, 
UK, Japan, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Israel, and France. However, as a percentage of 
domestic listings Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg dominate with more cross-listings 
than domestic companies.8 The lowest percentage of cross-listings (1%) is from Spain with just 
40 cross-listings and 3,378 domestic firms. This is followed by Hong Kong and Singapore, with 
both 3%.  
 
The 21 emerging home markets (first columns of Panel B) hold 14,219 domestic listings from 
which 623 firms cross-list (17.2% of our sample). This, on average, implies a cross-listing 
activity of about 4% from emerging markets and demonstrates a marked difference in the cross-
listing activity of firms from developed or emerging markets. India has the most cross-listings 
(164), followed by South Africa (96). By percentage of domestic listings the largest countries are 
Hungary, Mexico, Argentina and South Africa. The lowest percentages of cross-listing are 
observed for Egypt, Malaysia and Thailand all with about 1%. 
 
Panel A of Table 1 also presents summary statistics for developed countries as the host markets 
(last columns). All 24 developed markets that are home to cross-listed firms also serve as a host 
market and collectively represent the host market for 99% of the cross-listed firms in our sample. 
Not surprisingly, the US is the most popular destination market for cross- listing with 1,404, or 
nearly 40% of the sample. This is followed by the UK with 475 cross-listings. We further 
                                                          
8This is possible if firms cross-list in more than one host market. In this case, each cross-listing is counted in the 
number of cross-listings.  
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observe significant cross-listings in both Switzerland and Luxembourg, traditional tax haven 
countries. As a percentage of the number of host country domestic firms, Luxembourg is the 
most popular destination market with 775%, indicating it hosts considerably more firms than it 
has domestic listings (279 cross-listings compared with just 36 domestic listings). We also 
observe high percentages in the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland.  
 
Panel B shows that far fewer emerging countries host cross-listings (last columns), and those 
firms that do cross-list into an emerging market tend to originate from another emerging market. 
Only eight countries in our emerging sample host cross-listed firms and, with the exception of 
South Africa, typically host fewer than five firms.   
 
Table 1 further reveals that there is considerable clustering in cross-listings. From a home market 
perspective, we observe that most firms cross-list in a single host market. For instance, Canada, 
with 651 cross-listings, has 567 of these in the US (87%). Likewise, Chilean and Israeli cross-
listings are predominantly in the US. Indian, Irish, Polish and Egyptian firms cross-list primarily 
in the UK. We observe similar patterns for host markets, all firms cross-listing in Ireland are 
from the UK and 95% of firms cross-listing in NZ are from Australia. Such strong clustering in 
the choice of destination market may indicate a familiarity bias in the choice of destination 
market.  
 
4. RESULTS 
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4.1 CULTURAL BIAS STATISTICS 
Table 1 shows some evidence of clustering in the destination market for cross-listings. To more 
formally test for such clustering and whether the clustering could be attributable to culture, we 
use the Coval and Moskowitz (1999) Local Bias statistic. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) use this 
statistic to examine the role of geographic distance in explaining the home bias, i.e. to measure 
whether local investors have a bias towards geographically closer markets. This measure is also 
used by Sarkissian and Schill (2004) to examine the role of geographic distance in explaining the 
cross-listing decision. In this paper, we modify this statistic to test for a cultural proximity bias in 
the cross-listing decision. Specifically, we compute this statistic for home country i as: 
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where Hij is given as 
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with CLij the number of cross-listings from home country i to host country j and CLi is the total 
number of companies with a listing in any other market. Bj is the benchmark ratio of cross-
listings (or the expected number of cross-listings if there is no proximity bias) to the total number 
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of cross-listings from country i. To compute the benchmark weights (Bj) we follow Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) and a use the market capitalization of each 
host country as a proportion of the market capitalization of all countries. CDij is the cultural 
distance between country i and j; and BiCD  is the value-weighted average cultural distance for 
home country i, i.e., 
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Including this value-weighted average cultural distance benchmark in the calculation of the 
BIAS-statistics controls for the fact that some countries are, on average, more culturally distant 
from the rest of the world than other countries.  A positive value for the BIAS statistic implies a 
positive cultural proximity bias, i.e. companies prefer to cross-list shares in countries that are 
culturally more similar, whereas a negative statistic implies a preference for countries that are 
more culturally distant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
In Table 2, we report the results for the cultural proximity bias and the BIAS statistics for each 
country. The Actual column presents the weighted average cultural distance per country, or CDi 
= ∑HijCDij. The Benchmark column presents the weighted average cultural difference if cultural 
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proximity plays no role and cross-listing occurred proportional to market capitalization. The 
difference between these two values indicates a cultural proximity bias. Specifically, where 
Actual is less than Benchmark, we get a positive BIAS statistic, indicating a preference for 
culturally similar cross-listing destinations.  
 
For our developed home markets (the first columns of Panel A), we observe positive biases for 
all markets. In most cases, these biases are significant except for Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Singapore. New Zealand, Canada and Australia display the greatest bias, 
indicating a strong preference to invest in culturally similar markets. Overall, this suggests that 
firms prefer to cross-list in culturally similar markets.  
 
The results for the developed countries as host markets (the last columns of Panel A) show 
mainly significant positive BIAS statistics, indicating that the companies choosing to cross-list 
into those markets come from culturally similar countries. For eight countries, however, we 
observe significantly negative BIAS statistics, suggesting that these markets are favoured by 
firms from culturally distant countries. These markets appear to be large financial centres, such 
as the US, UK, Germany and France, or tax havens such as Luxembourg and Switzerland. This 
suggests that some markets may be preferred for other reasons rather than cultural similarities, 
such as tax laws or market development reasons.  
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Panel B of Table 2 presents the same analysis for our sample of emerging markets. The results 
for the emerging home markets suggest that cultural proximity plays little role in the choice of 
destination market. Only three countries have significant BIAS statistics, and two of those 
countries have negative statistics (Greece and Portugal), suggesting firms from those countries 
seek culturally disparate countries to list in. This finding is consistent with Beugelsdijk and 
Frijns (2010) who found that cultural distance plays no role in the foreign asset allocation 
decision of emerging market investors.  
 
When we consider the emerging countries that host cross-listed firms, we see that they all have 
significant and positive BIAS statistics. The implication of this finding is that those firms 
seeking to cross-list in an emerging market seek culturally similar markets. However, these are 
likely to be restricted to predominantly emerging market firms, and as the result in Table 1 
suggests, most emerging country cross-listings seek developed host markets.  
 
4.2 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
While the univariate analysis supports the hypothesis that cultural distance influences the cross-
listing decision, we conduct regression analysis to ensure this relationship is not driven by other 
potential motivations. We estimate the following equation:  
 
ijijmmijij ControlsCDDepVar εγβα +++= 1 ,       (5) 
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where DepVarij is one of three measures of cross-listing activity detailed below, CDij is the 
cultural distance between the home country i and host country j calculated as in Equation (1), 
and Controlsijm are various control variables. 
 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
We use three different measures of cross-listing activity in our empirical analysis. Our first 
measure is defined as the number of cross-listings between a specific pair of home and host 
countries, divided by the total number of domestic companies in the home country. Specifically, 
 
i
ij
ij
DC
CL
G = ,       (6)  
where CLij is the number of cross-listings from home i to host j and DCi is the total number of 
domestic companies listed in home country i. In essence, this measure computes the proportion 
of firms listing in a particular host market relative to all domestically listed firms and is the same 
measure employed in Sarkissian and Schill (2004). 
 
Our second measure is defined as the number of cross-listings between a specific pair of home 
and host countries, divided by the total number of cross-listed companies from the home country, 
Hij, as defined in Equation (3). Our final measure of cross-listing activity is a dummy variable 
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that equals one if there are any cross-listings from home country i to host country j, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
4.2.2 Control Variables 
While we postulate that cultural proximity between countries is a key factor in explaining the 
cross-listing decision, cultural proximity is likely to be correlated with other measures of 
proximity (see also Sarkissian and Schill, 2004). For example, countries may share a common 
language, be geographically close, and have similar legal systems, economic and industrial 
structures. To control for these potential explanations, we include several control variables in 
Equation (5).  
 
First, we include a dummy for shared language. Shared language is often used as a measure for 
cultural proximity (see Sarkissian and Schill, 2004) and hence we include this control variable to 
examine whether our cultural distance measure is not just a proxy for common language. Based 
on the proximity preference argument (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004), we expect a positive 
relationship between shared language and cross-listing activity. 
 
Second, we include a dummy for shared common law, which is one if both countries have 
common law legal systems. As common law is largely restricted to current and former members 
of the British Commonwealth, this measure captures a shared historical background and also 
controls for the superior investor protection prevalent in common law countries (see e.g. La Porta 
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et al., 1998). Based on the proximity preference argument (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004), we 
again expect a positive relationship between shared common law and the proportion of cross-
listing to a particular country. 
 
Third, we include the log of the geographical distance in kilometres between the countries’ main 
financial centres.9 Sarkissian and Schill (2004) show that geographic distance is negatively 
related to the proportion of cross-listing to a particular country. In addition, Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001) find that investors prefer stocks of firms that are headquartered in nearby 
locations, and Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) find that geographic distance has a negative impact 
on foreign asset allocation. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between geographic 
distance and the proportion of cross-listing to the host market.  
 
The next two control variables are economic and industrial proximity as employed by Sarkissian 
and Schill (2004). Economic proximity is measured by the percentage of home country i’s 
exports going to host country j. Industrial proximity is measured by the correlation of industry 
rankings between each pair of countries. For both variables, we expect a positive relationship. 
 
Alexander et al. (1987) and Errunza and Miller (2000) argue that firms seek to cross-list to 
overcome market segmentation. Higher segmentation means markets are less likely to move 
together, and, from an investor’s point of view, offer greater diversification benefits. We capture 
                                                          
9Geographic distances are the distances between the major financial centres of the countries calculated “as the crow 
flies”. Data source: the distance calculator from http://www.geobytes.com. 
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the level of segmentation between markets by using the correlation between stock market index 
returns of host and home countries (see also Chan et al., 2005; Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010), 
calculated using monthly Datastream Total Market index returns in local currency over the past 
five years. The market segmentation hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between 
correlation and cross-listings.  
 
To control for the legal bonding motivation for cross-listing posited by Doidge et al. (2004), we 
include a variable that measures the difference in the quality of the investor protection laws. 
Legal is calculated as the difference in investor protection between the host and home markets. 
We measure the investor protection of the home and host markets using the Anti-Self Dealing 
index of Djankov et al. (2008). We expect a positive relationship between the difference in legal 
environment and the extent of cross-listing activity. 
 
We also control for liquidity motives for cross-listing (see Foerster and Karolyi, 1998) by 
including the log difference in market liquidity between the host and home markets. This 
difference is computed by the market turnover ratio (the value of the Datastream Total Market 
index’s annual trading volume) divided by the index’s market capitalization for the period 2002-
2006. More liquid markets are expected to attract more cross-listings and hence we expect a 
positive relationship with cross-listing.  
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More economically and financially developed markets are likely to offer greater benefits to 
cross-listing firms. We control for differences in economic development by employing Economic 
Development, computed as the log difference in GDP per capita in 2006 (measured in US$) 
between the host and home market. Financial Development is computed as the log difference in 
the ratio of total stock market capitalization to GDP between host and home market. All values 
are from 2006, stock market capitalization values come from the World Federation of 
Exchanges’ statistics, while country GDP is collected from UN statistics division. 10 We expect 
that host countries with higher levels of economic and financial development relative to those of 
the home country attract larger number of foreign listings.  
We further include an emerging home market indicator to capture significant differences in 
motivations to cross-list by companies from developed and from emerging markets. We follow 
Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Bekaert et al (2003) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) to classify 
countries into developed and emerging.  
 
Finally, we control for host market fixed effects, as some markets may be more attractive for 
cross-listings for institutional reasons, e.g. tax havens, large financial centres etc.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
                                                          
10
Available online at http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics  and http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm 
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In Table 3, we report the results for Equation (5). We split Table 3 into three panels. Panel A 
reports the results for the log(Gij) calculated as in Equation (6) as the dependent variable. In 
Panel B, the dependent variable is log(Hij) calculated as in Equation (3). Because the dependent 
variables in Panels A and B are both left-censored, we estimate Equation (5) as a Tobit model.11  
In Panel C, we use the cross-listing dummy variable D_CLij, which is set to one if there are any 
cross-listings between a particular host-home pair of countries. As the dependent variable is a 
dummy, we use a Probit model to estimate a probability of cross-listing from home i to host j. 
For each measure of cross-listing activity, we estimate Equation (5) for the full sample and for 
developed and emerging home markets separately.  
 
For the full sample, we observe some significance for the predicted relationship between our 
measures of cross-listing activity and cultural distance. We observe significance at the 10% level 
for one of the three dependent variables (cross-listing activity as a percentage of all home market 
firms and as a percentage of all cross-listed home market firms are insignificant). However, for 
the developed home countries sample we observe a strong and consistently significant negative 
relationship across all three dependent variables, indicating that cultural distance plays an 
important role in the cross-listing decision for firms from developed markets. This provides 
strong support for our hypothesis that firms prefer to cross-list into a market that is culturally 
similar to their home market. The results for the emerging markets are in line with the results in 
Table 2, which show that cultural distance is not a major determinant of the destination market.  
 
                                                          
11In many situations there are no cross-listings for a particular home-host pair of countries. In these situations the 
ratio of cross-listings is zero. In that value was set at .0001 and the natural log of that value was used as the 
dependent variable.  
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In line with prior literature, we observe that other measures of proximity between home and host 
countries affect the distribution of cross-listings and the probability of cross-listing across host 
countries. More specifically, shared language, economic and industrial proximity and shared 
common law between home and host countries are positive determinants of cross-listing activity 
between the countries, while geographic distance is a negative determinant of the cross-listing 
activity. These results are in line with the findings of Sarkissian and Schill (2004) and further 
confirm the presence of a proximity bias in corporate decision to cross-list. 
 
For our controls for other motivations and differences in market quality, we find that the 
correlation between stock market returns of the home and host markets is a positive significant 
determinant of the cross-listing activity. This is contrary to the predictions of the market 
segmentation theory of cross-listing. Possibly, higher market return correlations reflect higher 
levels of similarity between the stock markets. In this case, the positive sign of the correlation 
variable suggests further evidence for the proximity preference argument, i.e. companies tend to 
cross-list in markets that are driven by similar factors. An improvement in legal environment is a 
significant positive determinant of cross-listing destination for firms from developed markets 
while the relationship reverses for firms from emerging markets. Firms from emerging markets 
do not cross-list as frequently in foreign markets with stricter investor protection laws, possibly, 
due to prohibitively high disclosure and compliance costs. Furthermore, we find contrary 
evidence for both the liquidity and financial development variables. Other variables are not 
consistently significant.  
 
24 
 
4.3 ROBUSTNESS TEST 
To examine whether our conclusions on the role of cultural proximity in the decision to cross-list 
is sensitive to the choice the measure of cultural distance measure, we employ three alternative 
culture frameworks. First, we use the cultural value indices of Tang and Koveos (2008), which 
are an updated version of the Hofstede cultural value dimension scores.12 Second, we employ 
societal practices scores from the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
(GLOBE) project (House et al, 2004). The GLOBE scores are based on survey data of almost 
1,000 local organizations in 62 countries. The GLOBE project has expanded Hofstede’s 
framework to nine dimensions of cultural values and practices to quantify national cultures: 
Performance Orientation, Assertiveness Orientation, Future Orientation, Humane Orientation, 
Institutional Collectivism, Family Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism, Power Distance, and 
Uncertainty Avoidance.13 Although some of the cultural dimensions of Hofstede and the GLOBE 
are comparable, there are significant conceptual and methodological differences between these 
two cultural frameworks (e.g. see Smith, 2006). Finally, we use national cultural values from the 
World Value Survey (WVS).14,15 The World Value Survey has covered 97 societies and was 
conducted in five waves from 1981 to 2008. We follow Ahern et al. (2011) and calculate national 
averages to the responses of three survey questions focusing on Trust, Hierarchy and 
Egalitarianism. For each alternative cultural framework, we recalculate our measure of cultural 
distance as in Equation (1) and re-estimate Equation (5).  
 
                                                          
12 Cultural scores from Tang and Koveos (2008) has been used in the literature, see for example Callen et al. (2010).  
13 The GLOBE cultural framework has been employed by, for example, Sarala and Vaara (2010). 
14 The World Value Survey data are available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
15 The World Value Survey cultural framework has been used, for example, in Guiso et al. (2008) and Ahern et al. 
(2011). 
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INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results.16 Coefficient estimates for all three alternative cultural 
distance variables are negative and statistically significant for the developed markets sub-sample. 
These results confirm our findings in Table 3 and show that larger cultural distance between the 
home and host countries results in less cross-listing activity between those countries. Table 4 
confirms the insignificant role of cultural distance for emerging market firms, consistent with our 
earlier findings.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper extends the existing literature on international cross-listings in several ways. First, we 
extend the work of Sarkissian and Schill (2004) by examining the concept of cultural distance 
and the role it plays in the choice of destination market. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) measure 
cultural proximity in terms of common language and colonial ties, rough proxies of culture. We 
exploit more developed cultural frameworks such as Hofstede’s (2001) Cultural Dimension 
scores to more accurately quantify the differences in culture between countries. After controlling 
for traditional motivations for cross-listing, we confirm the importance of cultural distance. Our 
findings demonstrate that a country’s cultural values are important determinants of why 
companies from particular countries tend to cross-list more actively in particular host markets. 
More specifically, we show that the distribution of international cross-listings is significantly 
affected by the differences in cultural distance between country pairs. Our results are robust to 
                                                          
16 To save space, estimates of control variables are not reported but were consistent with those reported in Table 3. 
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alternative measures of cross-listing activity, estimation procedures, and alternative measures of 
cultural distance. Our results also highlight a notable dichotomy between the cross-listing 
motivations of emerging and developed market firms. In particular, we document the cultural 
proximity is an important consideration for cross-listing destination for companies from 
developed markets but appears to be dominated by other motivations for companies from 
emerging markets. Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on the role of culture in 
financial decision making. Our results highlight the importance of culture in corporate financing 
decisions and urge for further research in this area. 
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Table 1. Sample Description 
 As Home Market  As Host Market 
Country DCi CLi CLi/DCi Max Clij  DCj ∑CLij ∑CLij/DCj Max Clij 
PANEL A: DEVELOPED MARKETS 
Australia 1,751 172 0.10 87  1,751 60 0.034 26 
Austria 96 12 0.13 6  96 34 0.354 19 
Belgium 137 34 0.25 9  137 129 0.942 35 
Canada 3,790 651 0.17 567  3,790 95 0.025 62 
Denmark 190 13 0.07 7  190 10 0.053 7 
Finland 136 19 0.14 6  136 2 0.015 2 
France 642 109 0.17 37  642 206 0.321 45 
Germany 656 151 0.23 29  656 193 0.294 54 
Hong Kong 1,165 38 0.03 17  1,165 2 0.002 1 
Ireland 59 75 1.27 55  59 17 0.288 17 
Israel 606 149 0.25 124  606 5 0.008 4 
Italy 284 37 0.13 17  284 23 0.081 9 
Japan 2,857 234 0.08 54  2,857 138 0.048 80 
Luxembourg 36 40 1.11 9  36 279 7.750 121 
Netherlands 128 151 1.18 42  128 159 1.242 77 
New Zealand 151 33 0.22 26  151 91 0.603 87 
Norway 195 27 0.14 12  195 21 0.108 5 
Singapore 461 14 0.03 6  461 44 0.095 9 
Spain 3,378 40 0.01 11  3,378 5 0.001 2 
Sweden 276 60 0.22 15  276 32 0.116 8 
Switzerland 256 51 0.20 15  256 175 0.684 71 
Taiwan 688 69 0.10 47  688 3 0.004 2 
UK 2,913 285 0.10 143  2,913 475 0.163 104 
US 5,133 551 0.11 104  5,133 1,404 0.274 567 
All developed markets 25,984 3,015 0.12 567  25,984 3,602 0.139 567 
PANEL B: EMERGING MARKETS 
Argentina 101 28 0.28 20  101 1 0.01 1 
Brazil 347 40 0.12 34  347 3 0.009 1 
Chile 244 26 0.11 25      
China 1,421 37 0.03 29      
Colombia 94 5 0.05 3      
Czech Rep 26 5 0.19 4      
Egypt 595 7 0.01 7      
Greece 288 25 0.09 10      
Hungary 41 14 0.34 5      
India 5,952 164 0.03 121      
Indonesia 344 9 0.03 4      
Korea 1,689 56 0.03 22      
Malaysia 1,021 7 0.01 4  1,021 3 0.003 3 
Mexico 132 40 0.30 40  132 1 0.008 1 
Philippines 238 11 0.05 5      
Peru - - - -  189 1 0.005 1 
Poland 253 12 0.05 11  253 5 0.02 2 
Portugal 47 7 0.15 4  47 2 0.043 2 
Russia 193 16 0.08 10      
South Africa 359 96 0.27 35  359 17 0.047 7 
Thailand 518 6 0.01 2      
Turkey 316 12 0.04 9      
All emerging markets 14,219 623 0.04 121  2,449 33 0.018 7 
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The table reports summary statistics on cross-listing activity as of December 2006 for each sample country as a 
home market and as a host market, in Panel A for developed markets and in Panel B for emerging markets. DCi is 
the total number of domestic listed companies in home country i. CLi is the total number of cross-listings from home 
country i. CLij is the number of cross-listings from the home country i to the host country j. 
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Table 2. Coval-Moskowitz Test for Cultural Bias of Cross-listings 
 Cultural Distance by Home Market  Cultural Distance by Host Market 
 Actual Benchmark BIASi  Actual Benchmark BIASi 
PANEL A: DEVELOPED MARKETS 
Australia 0.624 0.981 36.44% ***  2.418 1.096 -1.21% *** 
Austria 1.469 1.832 19.81% **  0.599 1.891 0.68% *** 
Belgium 1.354 1.694 20.06% **  1.389 1.726 0.2% *** 
Canada 0.581 1.07 45.73% ***  0.739 1.157 0.36% *** 
Denmark 1.826 2.31 20.98% ***  0.255 2.358 0.89% *** 
Finland 1.474 1.742 15.35% ***  0.04 1.774 0.98% *** 
France 1.55 1.764 12.13% ***  2.807 1.783 -0.57% *** 
Germany 1.045 1.201 12.96% **  2.662 1.27 -1.1% *** 
Hong Kong 1.946 2.201 11.55% **  0.011 2.12 1% *** 
Ireland 0.687 1.301 47.21% ***  0.038 1.375 0.97% *** 
Israel 1.84 1.883 2.28%  0.02 1.925 0.99% *** 
Italy 1.132 1.273 11.13% **  0.336 1.338 0.75% *** 
Japan 2.149 2.259 4.90%  1.843 2.281 0.19% *** 
Luxembourg 1.288 1.325 2.81%  8.098 1.361 -4.95% *** 
Netherlands 1.935 2.02 4.18%  2.51 2.065 -0.22% *** 
New Zealand 0.609 1.225 50.31% ***  0.308 1.319 0.77% *** 
Norway 1.881 2.232 15.72% ***  0.444 2.263 0.8% *** 
Singapore 2.578 2.642 2.43%  1.896 2.561 0.26% *** 
Spain 1.598 1.772 9.82% **  0.087 1.764 0.95% *** 
Sweden 2.003 2.448 18.19% ***  0.94 2.478 0.62% *** 
Switzerland 1.066 1.175 9.24% **  1.564 1.248 -0.25% *** 
Taiwan 1.809 2.206 17.98% *  0.348 2.134 0.84% *** 
UK 1.031 1.207 14.63% ***  20.484 1.322 -14.5% *** 
United States 1.251 1.518 17.57% ***  30.476 1.714 -16.78% *** 
PANEL B: EMERGING MARKETS 
Argentina 1.625 1.649 1.43%  0.015 1.648 0.99% *** 
Brazil 2.019 1.868 -8.12%  0.049 1.823 0.97% *** 
Chile 2.806 2.446 -14.73%     
China 2.5 2.382 -4.92%     
Colombia 2.119 2.336 9.26%     
Czech Rep 1.494 1.371 -9.01%     
Egypt 2.41 1.938 -24.38%     
Greece 2.801 2.317 -20.87% ***     
Hungary 1.54 1.621 4.96%     
India 1.625 1.771 8.26%     
Indonesia 2.591 2.421 -7.04%     
Korea 2.323 2.353 1.28%     
Malaysia 2.757 2.719 -1.37%  0.032 2.623 0.99% *** 
Mexico 2.549 2.2 -15.83%  0.005 2.148 1% *** 
Peru - - -  0.005 2.335 1% *** 
Philippines 2.16 2.317 6.75%     
Poland 2.13 1.738 -22.54%  0.441 1.747 0.75% *** 
Portugal 2.81 2.567 -9.47% *  0.051 2.513 0.98% *** 
Russia 3.093 2.577 -20.03%     
South Africa 1.035 1.137 8.94%  0.087 1.179 0.93% *** 
Thailand 1.622 2.272 28.61% ***     
Turkey 2.277 1.955 -16.48%     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The table reports the results of the test for bias in cultural distance of cross-listings for home and host markets using 
methodology of Coval and Moskowtiz (1999), in Panel A for developed markets and in Panel B for emerging 
markets. Actual is the weighted average cultural distance per country: CDi = ∑HijCDij, where Hij is the ratio of cross-
listings from home country i to host country j to the total number of cross-listings from country i and CDij is the 
cultural distance between country i and j calculated as the Euclidean distance with Hofstede cultural scores. 
Benchmark is the benchmark-weighted average cultural distance for home country i: ∑
=
=
J
j
ijj
B
i CDBCD
1
, where Bj is 
the benchmark ratio of cross-listings to the total number of cross-listings from country i, calculated using the 
proportion of  the total market capitalization of a country in the total market capitalization of all countries. The 
BIAS-statistics is computed as follows: ∑
=






−=
J
j
B
i
ij
ijji
CD
CD
HBBIAS
1
)( . 
  
35 
 
Table 3. Regression analysis: Cultural Distance and Cross-listing Decision 
 Exp. 
sign 
(A) Tobit Model: ln(Gij), (Gij=CLij/DCi) (B) Tobit Model: ln(Hij), (Hij =CLij/CLi) (C) Probit Model: D_CLij 
All 
Countries 
Developed 
Markets 
Emerging 
Markets 
All 
Countries 
Developed 
Markets 
Emerging 
Markets 
All 
Countries 
Developed 
Markets 
Emerging 
Markets 
Hofstede cultural  - -0.44 -0.67*** -0.95 -0.59 -1.07*** -0.88 -0.16* -0.24** 0.06 
distance  (-1.63) (-2.60) (-1.11) (-1.49) (-2.84) (-0.67) (-1.75) (-2.09) (0.27) 
Language + 1.08** 0.79 1.40 1.24 1.01 0.83 0.37* 0.36 0.32 
  (2.08) (1.44) (0.80) (1.55) (1.26) (0.28) (1.81) (1.39) (0.78) 
Common law + 1.17* 2.63*** -3.05** 1.87* 3.51*** -3.43 0.44* 0.86*** -0.05 
  (1.75) (3.55) (-2.16) (1.83) (3.28) (-1.48) (1.76) (2.70) (-0.10) 
Geo distance - -0.96*** -0.67*** -1.89*** -1.37*** -0.82** -3.05*** -0.18*** 0.04 -0.30** 
  (-5.25) (-3.00) (-4.03) (-4.89) (-2.50) (-4.25) (-2.61) (0.41) (-2.48) 
Econ prox  + 0.06* 0.06 0.07* 0.09* 0.07 0.10 0.05*** 0.15*** 0.04** 
  (1.90) (1.05) (1.96) (1.70) (0.93) (1.61) (3.48) (3.91) (2.09) 
Industrial prox + 2.97*** 2.83*** 3.33** 4.06*** 3.75*** 4.76** 0.90*** 1.10*** 0.62 
  (4.52) (4.45) (2.19) (4.15) (3.95) (2.06) (4.12) (4.12) (1.57) 
Correlation - 1.68*** 1.90** 0.62 2.56*** 3.20*** 0.82 0.67*** 1.06*** 0.57** 
  (2.86) (2.34) (0.58) (2.96) (2.62) (0.51) (3.39) (3.06) (2.28) 
Legal  + 0.35 1.16** -1.78* -0.01 1.06* -3.06** 0.07 0.37** 0.02 
  (0.85) (2.57) (-1.83) (-0.02) (1.71) (-2.06) (0.49) (2.05) (0.09) 
Liquidity  + -0.16 -0.34** 0.41 -0.41* -0.63*** 0.41 -0.10* -0.13** 0.04 
  (-1.02) (-2.21) (1.02) (-1.83) (-2.94) (0.65) (-1.90) (-2.25) (0.40) 
Fin development + -0.61** -0.53** -1.47** -0.94*** -0.90** -2.27** -0.21*** -0.26*** -0.26** 
  (-2.42) (-2.12) (-2.36) (-2.61) (-2.48) (-2.50) (-2.62) (-2.67) (-2.11) 
Econ development + -0.14 -1.13* -0.52 -0.02 -1.02 -0.58 -0.00 -0.23 0.07 
  (-0.47) (-1.88) (-1.11) (-0.04) (-1.17) (-0.83) (-0.01) (-0.98) (0.61) 
Home EM  - -1.30*   -1.99**   -0.54**   
  (-1.96)   (-2.01)   (-2.54)   
Host country fixed 
effects 
  
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
           
Observations  1,408 744 664 1,408 744 664 1,408 744 664 
Left-censored obs.  1,112 522 590 1,112 522 590    
Log likelihood  -1061.2 -717.9 -276.9 -1185.4 -806.6 -309.2 -385.0 -244.1 -113.1 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The table report regression estimation results using the sample of cross-listings from 45 home markets in 32 host markets as of December 2006. Panel A reports 
results for the dependant variable the log Gij defined as the number of cross-listings from home country i in host country j, divided by the total number of 
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domestic companies in the home country i: 
iijij DCCLG = . Panel B reports results for the dependant variable the log Hij defined as the number of cross-listings 
listings from home country i in host country j, divided by the total number of cross-listed companies from the home country i:
iijij CLCLH = . Both Panel A and B 
report Tobit model estimation results. Panel C reports results for the dependant variable D_CLij, a dummy variable set to one if there are any cross-listings from 
home country i in host country j. Panel C reports Probit model estimation results. For each dependent variable the results are reported for the full sample, for 
developed and emerging home markets. Hofstede cultural distance is the cultural distance between the home country i and host country j calculated as the 
Euclidean Distance using Hofstede’s (2001) culture scores. Language is a dummy variable set to one if the home country i and host country j share an official 
language. Common law is a dummy variable set to one if both home country i and host country j have common law legal systems. Geo distance is the log of the 
geographical distance in kilometres between the main financial centres of the home country i and host country j. Econ prox is the measure of economic proximity 
from Sarkissian and Schill (2004) defined as the percentage of the home country i’s export going to the host country j. Industrial prox is the measure of industrial 
proximity from Sarkissian and Schill (2004) defined as the correlation of industry rankings between the home country i and host country j. Correlation is the 
correlation between stock market index returns of host and home countries, calculated using monthly Datastream Total Market index returns in local currency 
over the past five years. Legal is the difference in investor protection between the host and home countries, calculated using the Anti-Self Dealing index of 
Djankov et al. (2008). Liquidity is the log difference in the market turnover ratios between the host and home markets, computed as the value of the Datastream 
Total Market index’s annual trading volume divided by the index’s market capitalization for the period 2002-2006. Fin development is the log difference in the 
ratio of total stock market capitalization (data obtained from the World Federation of Exchanges’ statistics) to GDP (data collected from UN statistics division) 
between host and home markets in 2006. Econ development is the log difference in GDP per capita in 2006 (measured in US$) between the host and home 
countries. Home EM is a dummy variable set to one if home country i is an emerging market. 
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Table 4. Alternative Measures of Cultural Distance 
 (A) Tobit Model: ln(Gij), (Gij=CLij/DCi) (B) Tobit Model: ln(Hij), (Hij =CLij/CLi) (C) Probit Model: D_CLij 
All 
Countries 
Developed 
Markets 
Emerging Markets All 
Countries 
Developed 
Markets 
Emerging 
Markets 
All 
Countries 
Developed 
Markets 
Emerging 
Markets 
     Panel I. Tang and Koveos’s Cultural Distance 
Tang Koveos  -0.07 -0.51*** -0.47 -0.05 -0.81*** -0.14 0.00 -0.10 0.33 
cultural distance (-0.36) (-2.64) (-0.58) (-0.18) (-2.78) (-0.11) (0.00) (-1.02) (1.48) 
          
Observations 1,044 616 428 1,044 616 428 1,044 616 428 
Left censored obs. 800 419 381 800 419 381    
Log likelihood -817.1 -597.8 -166.5 -926.7 -684.4 -186.8 -280.9 -195.9 -71.6 
     Panel II. GLOBE’s Cultural Distance       
GLOBE cultural -0.32* -0.63*** 0.71 -0.52** -1.00*** 1.15 -0.15** -0.30*** 0.07 
distance (-1.90) (-3.70) (1.37) (-2.04) (-3.94) (1.49) (-2.33) (-3.94) (0.70) 
          
Observations 1,091 567 524 1,091 567 524 1,091 567 524 
Left censored obs. 868 399 469 868 399 469    
Log likelihood -770.1 -511.6 -199.3 -871.4 -586.6 -223.4 -269.0 -165.4 -85.0 
     Panel III. WVS’s Cultural Distance       
WVS cultural -0.54** -0.53** -0.90 -0.85** -0.94** -0.97 -0.26** -0.31** -0.21 
distance (-1.99) (-2.21) (-1.01) (-2.08) (-2.37) (-0.78) (-2.29) (-2.14) (-1.12) 
          
Observations 532 252 280 532 252 280 532 252 280 
Left censored obs. 432 174 258 432 174 258    
Log likelihood -334.4 -221.0 -79.3 -381.8 -264.3 -88.5 -109.5 -70.1 -30.5 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The table report regression estimation results using the sample of cross-listings from 45 home markets in 32 host markets as of December 2006. Panel A reports 
results for the dependant variable the log Gij defined as the number of cross-listings from home country i in host country j, divided by the total number of 
domestic companies in the home country i: 
iijij DCCLG = . Panel B reports results for the dependant variable the log Hij defined as the number of cross-listings 
listings from home country i in host country j, divided by the total number of cross-listed companies from the home country i:
iijij CLCLH = . Both Panel A and B 
report Tobit model estimation results. Panel C reports results for the dependant variable D_CLij, a dummy variable set to one if there are any cross-listings from 
home country i in host country j. Panel C reports Probit model estimation results. For each dependent variable the results are reported for the full sample, for 
developed and emerging home markets. GLOBE cultural distance is the cultural distance between the home country i and host country j calculated as the 
Euclidean Distance using culture scores from the GLOBE project (House et al, 2004). WVS cultural distance is the cultural distance between the home country i 
and host country j calculated as the Euclidean Distance using culture scores from the World Value Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) calculated as 
national averages to the responses of three questions focusing on Trust, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism. All regressions include the same set of control variables as 
in Table 3; the estimates of control variables are not reported. 
